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The regional impact of the EEC
Part I. Background Material
Miceal Ross
Regional hnpact of national policies
When I was invited to calculate the regional impact of the EEC
on Ireland no published material was available. Now although the work is still
at a preliminary stage it is possible to measure some of the major impacts and
to identify a number of issues that will have a bearing for the future development
of policy. These issues also arise from a consideration of the impact of Irish
national policy of which the present study is a logical extension. A brief look
at the national studies may therefore provide an appropriate background to a
consideration of the Irish situalion. The presentation of the EEC impacts will
follow in part H.
In the previous study it was argued that all national policies and
programmes will have differential hnpacts on regions as a consequence of
regional differences in resource endowment, income and the size and characteristics
of population. This is so whatever the form the implementation of national policy
may take, be it monetary policy, fiscal policy related to tariffs and taxation,
subsidies, grants or other transfer payments, the direct purchase or provision
of goods and services or simply the regulation of the market. Accurate measurement
of the economic and social consequences of all policies at regional level was
therefore an important prerequisite to the framing of an effective regional policy.
The first stage of the analysis - performed at county level-
showed that contrary to popular belief in Ireland, the richest region - the East -
derived the greatest direct per capita benefit from government expenditures, due
mainly to the size of public sector wages and salaries. The h]termediate regions
of the south and east came next since these regions were well endowed to benefit
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from agricultural price supports and had urban structures that attracted manufacturing
firms. The poorer regions of the west and north in the years studied came last
and derived most of their receipts from social welfare payments that reflected
their aging and underemployed work forces. Comparing the public expenditures
thus allocated with per capita personal income levels revealed that whereas nationally
they reached 37% the regional range was from under 33% in the richest region to
over 43% in the poorest regions. Thus the smaller e:xpenditures in the poorer
regions accounted for a large proportion of local personal income. The analysis,
contained in Ross (1978), led the author to conclude that the outcome was at variance
with the stated objectives of regional policy.
To remedy the situation he proposed that more comprehensive approach
be adopted to regional policy. The unintended effects, of public expenditure could be
avoided by regional impact statements. However policy also needed to consider
the dynamic effects of active (rather than passive) infrastructural policies and the
scope for multidiseiplinary approaches to the planning of changes in institutional
arrangements, In making these proposals he benefitted from a highly imaginative
application of Weintraub’ s (1970) analytical framework of rural periphery and
societal center interactions to Irish regions by two sociologists, Ham~an and
O’Carroll (1976). Further theoretical support was derived from aspects of the
work of Myrdal (1957), Bauer (1971) and Sehumacher (1973) but particularly from
the insights of Chinitz (1971), the experienced American administrator, who held
that economic forces elicit a response from a region but do not determine it. The
other blade of the scissors is the spirit of the people as influenced by the economic
and socio-political superstructure. Comprehensive policy needs to consider how
to optimise this total response.
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The implications of the Weintraub model
The Weintraub model is exceedingly rich and superior to
alternative more simplistic and often doctrinaire models in its explanatory
power. It requires the identification of three major characteristics of regions:
1. The resource potential, the availability of a local mobilisation
system and the commitment of local leaders to development,
2. The power of the region to command the loyalties of its elites
and through them to make itself heard at the centre,
3. The model of national participation that provides its guiding image.
centre:
It also requires defining two major characteristics of the
1. The degree to which it is rich and possesses a mobilisation system,
2. The nat~ure of its commitment to regional development, the roles [t
assigns to centre and region ,and the model which informs its policies.
Weintraub (1970 p. 369) that saw the interaction of these five "macro social
factors not only determine actual policies and action programs but also may
delimit, a priori the extent of innovation, often irrespective of the specific
(regional) structures, needs, aspirations, and the potential of local modernizing
elites". Hammn and O’Carroll used the model to identify types of region within
Ireland and to ,’malyse the characteristics of the centre. The latter was committed
to development based on a model combining agricultural development,
indusi:rialtsation and physical plmming but devolving" a minimum of power to
the regions. The centre was not rich and had a poor mobilisation system. In
all, one plus and one mhms, whereas the ideal form of development would
require pluses on all 5 characteristics.
The shifting centre
Since accession to the EEC the East region centred on Dublin is
no longer exclusively the centre with which Irish regions interact. In EEC terms
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the whole of the Republic is one region and its powers of independent action are
in many areas circumscribed by the obligations of membership. A fresh appraisal
of the Weintraub model needs to ask of the EEC centre the same questions addressed
to Dublin formerly:-
I. Is it rich and does it possess a mobilisation system ?
2. What is the nature of it commitment to regionai development, what roles
does it assign to itself and the regions and what model of development informs
its policies ?
Clearly the Commission is not rich - the 1979 Budget is less than
0.9% of community G. D.P. - nor does it possess a mobllisation system, contenting
itself to work through market mechanisms for the most: part. In terms of Welntraub’s
analysis Brussels is not strong vis-a-vis the regions so that the success of the
whole EEC depends to a considerable extent on the willingness of the richer regions
to share responsibility for overall progress. More about this later.
The model of development
Brussels appears to be committed to regional development but
within the context of classical economics market.,oriented model. Irish people
will be conscious that entry into Europe was the second time that they have joined
a free trade area inspired by a similar model,- The first time was the elfforced
Act of (legislative) Union with the United Kingdom in 1801.- Like the Kingdom of
the two Sicilies, with which they share many parallels, they will be amxious to
avoid a recurrence of the disastrous consequences of the earlier experiment.
The circumstance of entry into Europe were different in many ways.
The decision to join was enthusiastically endorsed and the desire to be effective
Europeans is very real. The benefits to date have been significmlt and helped
revolutionisethe situation of both urban and rural dwellers. To date the snags
have not beer, apparent but it is typical of Irish approaches to look to historical
parallels to see the dangers that must be avoided.
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The historic parallel
In the historic context Irish economists would hold that the
development of a nation has typically followed a sustained period of high national
protection. Effective control of the Irish economy by Britain was established
in the early seventeenth century when parts of the country were colonized. Under
mercantilist theory Irish industry was suppressed since Ireland was no more
regarded an integral part of Britain than Lhe American colonies. A measure of
economic freedom was achieved at the time of the American War of Independence
but after a brief but prosperous two decades of protection the Act of U~on .forced
Ireland into a free trade area. The period of protection was too short and the
transition too abrupt so that most of the new industries in southern Ireland
withered though those of Belfast blossomed. The by now strong competitive
position of Britain led her to favour free trade for everyone - freedom is alwsys
prized by the strong. The newly developed classical economics extolled the
virtlles of the market and freedom from monopoly andbureancracy and provided
a theoretical rationale within which thoughts of protection could be shown as
aberrant.
This new economics supported ceatralisation and concentration.
Aids to regions distort competition and weaken efficiency. Better let the people
freely move to the jobs thin1 the reverse. The only state intervention permissible
is to uphold the rights of property (by enforcing contracts ere) or to ease the
adjustment problems of regions being run down or abandoned. The great famine
of Ireland brought home the extent to which people were able to use theory to
exonerate themselves from averting a social collapse that did more damage than
reduce the population of the area of the present Republic from 6.5 millions in
the 1840 to less than 3.0 millions in the 1960s. The legacies of this policy are
still there today in the regional disequilibria of Irish regions. London was a
powerful but not committed centre; the Irish regions were poor,powerless and
lacking leadership. Hechter’s (1975) book Internal colonialism the Celtic fringe
in British National Development 1536-1966 provides the atmosphere even if the
basic model has been questioned by Irish scholars. The lesson that Irish people
would glean from this historic parallel is that a free competition model is
inappropriate to the development of weaker regions and can be utterly disastrous
if coupled with a lack of commitment and/or resources at central level. Equally
economic answers are instffficJe nt of themselves to handle the problems of promoting
the mobilisation of weak regions.
The rationale of the EEC
The basic idea is that of a Common Market and the emphasis has
been oll free competition. The role of the centre has been kept weak and as in
Victorian England its main function is that of a policeman. The centre has no
say in intra EEC redistribution. The social Fund is Better named the retraining
Fund since it does ,mr carry the connotation one normally associates with soclal
policy. It seems to have been inspired by the needs of industrial areas suffering
from structural decline andits programmes were introduced to eater for the needs
of industrial societies experiencing tight labour markets. It is not clear that it
is adapted to the needs of preindustrial agricultural communities. Likewise aspects
of the regional fund imply that countries have a stock of industrial projects that
they could move out of areas of congestion. This is certainly not the case in Ireland.
In line with the thinldng that states or regions should not be given anytbing without
making a contributions schemes have been devised that suit particular circumstmuces.
To avail of them regions or states must put up some of the money. This benefits
those that have the most money already. It also means that poorer states will go
along with inappropriate schemes since it is hard to pass up money or because an
alternative national scheme more adapted to local circumstances is not permitted
by the rules of competition. Instances of these arrangements will be discussed in
part II.
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The accent has been on free trade and competition. The spur came
from the German need for industrial markets. Europe hoped to develop high
technology industries and to leave to the Third World the manufactnre of clothing,
footwear and textiles. A low external tariff would enable the Third World to
develop exports to pay for industrial imports. As part of the deal the European
coal and steel industries would be rationalised and Germany agreed to support
the agricultural production of France and the Netherlands - a departure from
free competition dictated by political realities even within Germany itself. The
Common Agricultural Policy stresses milk and cereals - an arrangement which
is particularly favourable to France and the Netherlands but less so to Italy.
The accent in agriculture is on prices rather than on structural reform.
Allocations under the Guidmlce section of FEOGA have been at the same insignificant
levels (compared to EEC GDP) as allocations to the social and regional funds.
While it might be argued that these funds would somehow be an inefficient use
of resources a more cynical interpretation would see them as a few sops to the
public conscience to hide the selfinterest of powerful lobbies. (Currently a common
fishery policy is being foisted on Ireland not based on the social and economic needs
of the West of Ireland or of the EEC consumers but to solve over capacity in
the French and Dutch fishing fleets. To a market oriented person the social
Consequences are as regretably but as inevitable as the Great Famine). The
costs of genuine structural reform would require expenditures much larger
than they currently are. Member state contributions would, therefore, need
to increase from the current level which does not differ greatly from the level
of their contributions to overseas development aid. Unlike the latter there is
is less chance to recoup the payments.
The setting up of the Common market catered for the special relationships
which member states had with countries outside the Community. Thus Germany
and Italy had special relations with Eastern Europe and Frmlce with her former
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colonies. Concessions were obtained for these which were not always neutral in
their impact on other members. The entry of Britain in turn brought concessions on
agricultural produce which have helped to contribute to European surplus and
enabled the UK to continue elements of its cheap food policy.
The entry of tile new members was negotiated against a background of
continuing boom and tight labour markets. Policies were designed to facilitate
adaptation to these conditions. Entry coincided with recession and rising unemployment
all round so that the rationale for the previous arrangements no longer re:tAn the
validity it did,even if the different circumstances of the new members had not
merited some ret!~inktng of strategies. While free trade has remained the dominant
theme the new cireumstmlces have seen a rapid rise o£ non-tariff barriers to trade
that is disquietening. These will be discussed in Part II.
Prior to the entry of the three the EEC enjoyed a sustained period of
prosperity with the gains and losses of most members (apart from Italy?) acceptable
to the generality of their members. The situation was clearly not one of a zero-
sun game. Ireland gained substantially from the agricultural arrm~gements, as we
shall see~but found a number of trends to be uneasy about. The arrival of Britain
added to the anti-CAP lobby. Agricultural surpluses were growing and monetary
instability was having perverse effects on the comparative advantage of Ireland as
a cheap agricultural producer. The first years of Union with Britain had been
years of agricultural prosperity which was shortlived.
Ireland had expected to benefit from the regional fund given that the
general level of its regional incomes was low. Table 1 indicates the broad picture
immediately prior to accession in 1972. Since the countries at the bottom of the
table have had depreciating currencies the range has widened since 1972. Ireland
Table 1
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Ranges in regional GD2 for member states in 1972
(US dollars per capita)
Average tlighe st Lowe st
GermmW 4070 633 8 3346
Nether lm~d s 3878 4290 3409
Denm ark 3763 na na
France 3609 576 8 2714
Luxembourg 3521 - -
Belgium 3408 5356 2889
UK 2609 3055 2059
Italy 2142 2874 1363
Ireland 1700 1982 1293
Source: derived from Regional Statistics 1975 Eurostat Ross e_t aj 1977
¯ has the lowest position told even its richest region only overlaps with regions
in one country - Italy’s Mezz0giorno.
Britain looked to the regional fund to help with its industrial
declining regions. Other members tended to identify regional problems in
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relation to their own national average rather than the Community’s. As a
consequence haft the EEC area and one third of its population were declared, eligible
to draw on what was a disappointingly small fund. Britain mid Italy were the
main beneficiaries,obtaining 63% of the total allocation compared with only 12%
of direct FEOGA payments. Ireland’s allocation did not adequately reflect her
low income,being about the same share as she enjoys under FEOGA. Any
movement to shift the balance between the funds, as Italy mid the UK are
attempting, would not influence greatly Ireland’s transfer receipts unless the
criteria for change were altered to concentrate on areas of greatest relative
need. Even if this did not occur the regional fund could conceivably have a more
beneficial impact than an equivalent amount of FEOGA transfers if it offered
more scope for structural change than farm payments permit. The latter do
have the attra.otion of not requiring any matching national payment and being
automatic they are less amenable to political pressures.
This practice occurs frequently in EECregulations eg. the FEOGA Guidance Fund.
While industrial policy seeks to create a unified market free
from competitive distortions the same effort is not expended on the common
agricultural policies. Mainly as a result of currency instability but also due
to high pricesjnational agricultural markets exhibit greater diversity now than
when the EEC was first mooted. Ireland’s interest lie in a unified market. The
MCA arrangement has posed difficulties for exporters associated with depreciating
currencies which are not often adverted to in debates. This is due to the distortions
.
of trade it has encouraged. Blancus (1978) has ably documented the growing
farm exports of Germany and the rapidly declining import deficits of Britain.
Apart from these trends,,wbich weaken Ireland’s comparative advantage,the MCA
system has permitted Britain to import agricultural produce at 25% below the Irish
price,or 40% below that obtaining Germany. That this has been of considerable
competitive advantage to British industry has been freely acknowledged by the
UK under secretary for Prices and consumer ~fairs, Maclennan (1978) who
concludes that a Common Market in agricult~ure cm’l only follow "a movement
towards harmonisation of inflation ~md growth rates by member states". This
argues for a fully comprehensive regional policy. In consideration of these
arguments and in view of the prospects of new members joining,whose regional
problems are more serious than Ireland’s,a thorough review of all EEC instruments
is necessary. In this review the role of the model of free competition needs to
be examined in relation to some theory of regional development m~d against the
background of the pos~-recession employment situation in all countries. In addition
the strengthening of the powers of the centre to improve its interaction with the
regions needs to be reexamined.
Current Irish regional objectives
The search for a regional policy in Ireland has sought to extend
beyond the traditional range of the classical economics competitive model. This
* Unfortunately in his study Blancus overlooked Irish membership of the EEC
or else assumed that we were still part of the U.K.
accounts for the interest in the practical applications of the Weintraub model
discussed above, To put this search in its setting some further details of tile
Irish situation may be of interest, In particular the dramatic change-about in
Irish conditions is probably not widely known.
After political independence the Irish economy continued to display
many of the features of its previous position as a British region. Ireland’s
speciaHsation in agriculture continued. After the introduction of the deficiency
payment scheme Britain was able to support her farmers and at the same time,
by maintaining an open import policy)enjoy the benefits of subsidised exloorts
from agricultural exporters denied other outlets for their produce. The British
cheap food system meant low incomes for Irish farmers. In certain areas
these incomes were further depressed by poor physical resources and bad
farming structures.
Independence did not result in a break in the parity link with sterling.
This may have been maintained in the interests of the new Irish classes, i~ore
likely it reflected the opinion that a small open economy like Ireland had little
to gain from breaking the link since the vast bu]k of trade was with the UK and
trade was an unusually high proportion of GNP. In the absence of monetary
instruments free movement of capital was ensured and the perceived absence of
viable local projects meant that profits tended to be invested abroad, Thus Ireland
was creditor nation with a low stmldard of living - a typical feature of an undeveloped
region.
On the industrial front protection did not follow independence but
rather the general movement in this direction internationally during the thirties.
Employment in industry rose. The composition of imports rather than their
volume changed. The second World War posed problems for these industries
aggravated by the total lack of a merchant naxry. Native entrepreneurs began
to appear. However by the mid fifities the limits of protection under Irish
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conditions became apparent and policy switched to the promotion of export-led
growth. This policy was linked to a policy of dispersed industrialisation. The
signing of the Anglo Irish Free Trade Agreement in 1966 initiated the phasing
out of Ireland’s second short period of protection. Had Ireland. not joined the
Common Market in 1973 mmly firms would have still had to face international
competition. Government policy sought to help them make the trm~sition through
reequipment and ratlonaltsation programmes. Nonetheless entry to the EEC,
coupled with the world recession,hastened the demise of the weaker firms, Unlike
the similar outcome following the Act of Union the new exporting firms were
geared to weathering the transition successfully and have contributed to the
remarkable growth and diver.sification in the pattern of Irish industrial exports
in recent years (see Kelmedy 1978).
The continuing regional status of the Irish economy is best seen
in relation to labour. Econometric work has identified the response of Irish
migration flows to conditions in the main British regions. This outflow of labour,
apart from reducing the national population, affected the rural/urban balance.
The century of demographic change up until the 1960’s can be summed up by saying
that whereas rural populations (settlements less than 1500 in population) dropped
by 2.05 millions (from 3.51 millions to 1.46 millions) urban populations increased
by only 0.5 millions (from 0.90 millions to 1.42 millions). The main urbanisation
occurred outside the State boundaries. Within the State urban growth has tended
to concentrate on the Dublin area.
Continuous high levels of outflow led to abnormal age profiles in
many areas, high dependency ratios, sparse populations, stunted towns and low
marriage rates. Apart from county Dublin regional populations generally were
from 59 to 86% rural and over half the workforce in these rural areas were engaged
in prhnary production as late as 1971.
The restoration of confidence of the Irish people in their own country
began with the programmes for Economic Development in the late fifties. It
was some thne before it was realised that the nadir of population decline had
been passed in 1961 and that .life was flowing back into the country. It is perhaps
necessary to be Irish to appreciate the public excitement when Walsh and other
began tb,document the dramatic demographic about-turn that followed. In little
over a decade the marriage rate had risen 50% and ~fected even the traditional
strongholds of rural celibacy. Birth numbers increased substantially until
the Irish growth rates in population were higher than the highest in Europe.
Net emigration was converted into net return flows. Year by year .fresh areas
that had recorded virtually unbroken declines in population for over a century
reported their first increases. Ross (1978) reported net migration inflows
into several regions. The evidence seemed to tally with the international
trend reported by Vining and Kontaly (197 8) that the unbroken upward trend in
urbanisation was diminishing. People were wi!ling,even m~ious,to remain in
their native rural areas if work could be provided for them.
The hope of turning these changes into permanent gains for Ireland
]].as encouraged the present Government to plan for full employment. The task
is formidable. While recorded unemployment is high at 10% the reality is more
serious with large numbers of unrecorded employed (mainly school leavers), low
participation rates, underempl0Yment and potential return flows of migrants,
Explicit government targets seek to reduce the outflow from agriculture and to
step up net job creation in manufacturing to high levels even by European standards.
Ross (1979) has analysed the implications of this policy in the context of the projected
growth in the labour force and the experience of job creation in the periods 1966
tO 1971 and 1971 to 1977. Some ideas of the magnitude of the task are contained
in Appendix Table !o Ross concluded that even though the agricui{:ural ant!
manufacturing targets were very ambitious (almost unrealistic) by historical
stand,-~rds, their achievement would leave a lot of extra jobs needed in other
sectors. Underemployment and computerisatlon would limit the scope of service
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sector multipliers to take up the slack while the limits to state expendit::re would
curtail the possibilities of public employment,assuming it was desirable. The
scope for subsidising foreign investment was restricted by the intense inLernational
competition for such firms. In these circumstances regional policy would need to
consider the development of new forms of local enterprise. This could be
encouraged by a reduction in the mm:y forms of monopoly - often on the part of
of public companies - which restricts local initiatives (e. g. high air fares harm
tourism) and by the development of an efficient set of infrastructures to make the
remoter areas more attractive.
In this regard EEC policy could play an important role. Grants
under the EMS are colffined to ini’rastructural development whereas communications
policy could help ensure greater reality to the goal of competition. Without the
prodding of Brussels these development could be deferred indefinitely.
Greater local initiative will’need:newinst[tutional arrangements with
greater power sharing devolved from the centre based on the principle of subsidiary
function. This heightened responsibility will need to be fostered in a way that leads
to m: appreciation and acceptance of the disciplines necessary for a sin.all open
economy seeking to achieve full empoyment for the first time.
Initially the project was
mid then to examine other EEC impacts not involving expenditure. Examination of
the rather sparse documentation indicated that there was no clear definition of what
transfers should be included and where they should be allocated, whether to Ireland
or elsewhere.
The difficulties of determining the costs and benefits can be seen from the
smokescreen of propaganda by the British advocates of protection - the Cambridge
Economic Policy Review group. The press campaign* sought to establish that
Britain derived few benefits from the EEC but bore the major share Of the costs in
spite of being one of the poorer members. Denmark, a rich country, on the other
hand, was a net beneficiary. In this argument Ireland was credited with the,highest
levels of benefit at £142 per head. An appeal to the EEC Commission for objective
analysis of this matter by Lord Bessborough - an ardent supporter of EEC member-
ship - led the Commission to observe that "the Commission does notbelieve it
possible to assessthe economic impact of the Budget on individual member states
without a long and time consuming study whose results would probably be open to
dispute". The Commission did provide reluctantly a statement of net transfers, not
on the basis of economic impact but purely in terms of the financial accounting of the
Financial Mechanism. These (set out in Table 2) showedboth the UKand Italy as net
beneficiaries in the year in dispute.
The Commission went on to draw attention to some factors which tended
to make the calculated transfers invalid as a measure of the gains and losses viz:
1) Since May 1976 MCAs have been paid in exporting countries only. Corrections
to favour importing countries "arguably do not wholly reflect the geographical incidence
of the benefits arising from the operations".
The Regional Impact of the EEC
Part II.
intended to allocate transfers on a regional basis
*see for example the Financial Times, November 14, 1978.
February 1, 1979.
Manchester Guardian,
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Table Accounting transfers adSusted for MC~’,~ .. ._
Recorded
transfers
1976 Million EUA 1977
Belgium/L,axembourg +357.6
Denmark +378.8
Federal Republic of
Germany -1014.9 -38.7 -1053.6
France +102.1 -44.0 +58.1
Ireland +I 94.4 -39.3 +I 55.1
Italy +209.8 +38.0 +247.8
Netherlands +295.2 -74.4 +220.8
United Kingdom -238.1 +148.3 -89.8
Other currencies +21.5 +21.5
Corrccted Recorded
MCAs trundlers transfers
-11.4 +346.2 +378.4
-84.8 +294.0 +519.6
-1891.7
-46.5
+408.5
-66.4
+286.1
-624. i
+16.7
Ch.~mge in Comm i s sion’ s
Balances with National
Treasuries2           -299.0                 -299.0
Differences on
+98 9
E:~z-hange R ate s3 -~ 7.4 +106.3 .
/ 0 0 0
Corrcc ted
MCAs transfers
- 49.6 +328.8
-226.6 +293.0 :
-175.2 -1466.8 "
-263.4 -309.9
-196.5 +212.O
+360.0 +293.6
-198.6 87.5
+749.9 %125.8
+16.7
+324.3
+95.i
0
(1) At the average exchange rates for the years In quest:on.
(2) The Nat’onal Treasuries maintain accounts In the name of the Commission.
¯ +324.3
+95.1
0
Although
(3)
¯
In different units.
the 1976 and....1 q-~zt, Budgets were in balance as executed, the balance on these accounts
c;~on~~:1 during the year. These balances do not earn intei’est mid can be used by the
Commission only to meet approved budgctary expenditure.
Tt:ese are ~.counting dhefcrcucc~ which arise because of the use of average exclu’m~e
rates rand, in ,qle case o£ MCAs in 1976, bccause thc agricultural accounts were kelSt
2) Customs duties are regarded as contributions by the country of entry. This
may not be accurate because the final cost may not be bolme by the importing countries:
some Irish imports are transhipped from the UK/
3) Payments are credited where they are paid - e.g. salaries in Brussels.
4) Food aid is credited to the country of purchase but it is doubtful whether this
is a true measure of the benefit to the country concerned.
It is possible to illustrate Points 1 and 4 above by reference to the four
major expenditures under the FEOGA guarantee scheme: viz:- dairy products, cereals,
sugar and beef which together exceeded 4 billion v.a. Table 3 gives the actual
transfers associated with these products. However where intervention or exports
occur, which relieve the surplus in the EEC generMly, the cost of such intervention
:
¯
¯ --
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helps all production though the intervention buying could have occurred exclusively
in one country. Accordingly Table 3 also calculates the value of the interventions
based on each country’s production. The difference indicates whether the
attributed benefit exceeds the actual or not. The exporters, Denmark, Ireland and
the Netherlands, have higher benefits attributed to them due to interventions being
more likely to occur in these countries. On the other hand Italy and the UK show
the opposite phenomenon. Here the unattributed benefits greatly exceed the actual.
This argument is illustrative of the difficulties of making intra-EEC comparisons.
Table 3: Payments of Transfers on major agricultural products 1977
Actual Benefit based
Country Transfers on production Difference
level
Belgium/Lux. 349.5
Denmark 302.9
France 1162.4
Germany 10 67.9
Ireland 214.5
Italy 168.2
Netherlands 644.3
UK 169.4
157.4 192.
211.8 91.
1297.2 -134.
861.4 206.
165.2 49.
437.3 -269.
322.7 321.
626.1 -456.
Total: 4079.1 4079.1 0
1
1
8
5
3
1
6
7
In this paper such comparisons are not central and in general the focus is
on the benefits to Ireland alone calculated without much reference to "shares". To
set this discussion in its context details of the EEC Budget and official (irish) state-
ments of transfers (based on the Financial Mechm~ism procedure) are given in
Appendix Table 2 and 3. Table 2 shows that only half of EEC receipts are derived
from GNP levies. The other half comes from agricultural levies and custom duties.
Ireland, as a small open economy, has very high import requirements relative to
other members and agriculture also looms larger in its economy. This method of
financing the EEC is, therefore, highly significant for Ireland.
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In Irelmld the main interest on the expenditure side is focused on
agriculture and social and regional affairs. Debate tends to lose sight of the :
fact that expenditures on research, development cooperation, other institutions
and administration expenditures rival those of the social and regional funds. This
paper will not discuss them in detail. However a few points are relevant at this
stage:
Administration:
The Commission is correct when it states that administration costs
benefit the whole Community. However in the Irish analysis of regional impacts
mentioned in Part I, salaries and wages were also recognised to have a local
multiplier effect. In this sense the location of civil servants is not neutral. It
will become more important still should the role of the Commission expand. At
present staff are unevenly distributed with the bulk in the Benelux countries and
Italy. (This table excludes European institutions like the University or the
Parliament) and relates only to the Commission on April 30 1978.
Belgium 6,996
Luxembourg 1,717
Netherlands 177
Italy 1,769
Germany 242
France 35
3 New members 55
Others 185
11,176
The eleven in Ireland are all centrally located in Dublin. In Italy almost all are
on the shores of Lake Maggiore’
Research etc.
Research expenditure has two sources of benefit - the sectors for whom
the research is done and the research institutions. Appendix Table 3 makes it
clear that Irish research institutions have not claimed much of this expenditure.
A partial explanation may be that the sectors benefitting are not major ones in
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Ireland. Nuclear power plants do not exist while the industrial payments are
aimed at shipbuilding, textiles and steel - again not major concerns in Ireland.
In section 1 of this paper the need for employment in sectors other than
farming and manufacturing was demonstrated. Clearly a stronger research
involvement would provide both employment and the spinoffs of technological
innovation that would facilitate further employment. Can Ireland develop such a
participation under the present arrangements ?
Development Assistmlce
At present the fund has three sections: work projects 87%, supplies
contracts 16% and technical assistance 17%. Ireland has been reasonably active
in technical assistmlce but totally out of the other areas. Works programmes
allocations have been 35% local, 24% Franch, 19% Italian and 12% German, UK
and Benelux 10%. Supply contracts have gone to Germany, 30%, France, 23% and
UK, 18%. The possibilities of change in Ireland’s role here and the regional
implications of such a change have not been explored, to my knowledge.
Other Institutions
I have no information on what ’other institutions’ are financed. Again
the general absence of significant coal and steel activities in Ireland means that
benefits from the Coal and Steel Community (and Euratom) have been negligible.
Overcapacity in steel, in fact, led the EEC to resist a proposal to develop Irish
Steel Holdings, though this resistmlce was later modified. Such regulation is
understandable butit does help those who have had a head-start hl a particular
industry.
--6 --
A gricu Iture
Since the main source of benefit to Ireland from the EEC has
been agriculture the paper proper will start with this sector. Here we are
fortunate to have Several attemps to quantify the impact, of which that of Attwood (1979)
is the most significant.
Attwood divided his analysis into 4 impacts (1) the economy as a
whole, (2) agriculture, (3) non agriculture (4) consumers. He presented the
transfer payments for each year and discussed the treatment of MCAs. In general
he favoured viewing them as a subsidy to consumers. However his methodology made
this debate irrelevant because he was concerned with the ¯impact of the EEC on
Ireland rather than the sharing of benefits between couatries.
The Economy as a whole
Any measuring of the EEC impact needs to have an alternative
situation for comparison. This alternative could be EEC membership with total
free trade in agricultureboth within and without the Community. The measure
of benefit to Ireland would be the difference between these true trading prices and
actual CAP prices. Such a measurement is however, impossible, though Irish
suspicions are that prices would be considerably higher than current "wor.ld"
prices. Such an arrangement could be quite beneficial to Ireland’s long run
interests, as argued in Section I.
Instead of this measure Attwood chose a situation of Ireland outside
the Community selling in the artificial world trade So that the average export refund
on exports to third countries could be taken as a measure of Ireland’s gain from
exports. His results, given in Appendix Table 4, show gains of £150, £169 and
£348 millions for the years 1976 to 1978. This method allows for MCAs so these
£24 millions may be deducted from the transfers of £106 millions in 1976 to leaVe
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a net £82 millions. This generous treatment of benefits would imply a total
gain of £232 millions in 1976.
The impact of these benefits has been seen in the balance of payments.
Agricultural exports rose in value from £257m. in 1972 to £1020m, in 1978 enabling
a rise in total overseas Trade from £1260 m in 1970 to £6, 600 m in 1978 to occur
without serious balance of payments constraints. Attwood then took Input-Output
Income multipliers developed for Ireland of 1968 by Copeland and Henry. His
calculations indicated a 10% addition to Irish GNP from agricultural exports as a
result of EEC membership in 1976, or £422 ml. Allowing for qualifications, such
as a 3.4% upward bias in the GNP multipliers and the generosity of gains, the
results are stili substantial. The figures in 1977 and 1978 were even higher -
£5.35 m and £1080 m or 10% and 17% of GNP. These agricultural exports has
low import multiplier effects so that Attwood reckoned that two thirds of gross
exports were net gains to the balance of payments.
The farm sector
The farm sector differs from the economy as a whole (a) by getting
only a small part of the multiplier effect and (b) by getting some income transfers
from non-farmers as a consequence of EEC membership, Attwood calculated the
agricultural sectoral multiplier of 0.4489 to add a further £100 millions. (About
a quarter of the totaIDNP multiplier).
On the question of the impact of the EEC on farm-nonfarm transfers
Art-wood assumed that nonmembership of the EEC would have meant that pre*entry
arrangements would have continued and that farm income supports would have
kept in line with general income increases. Thus he reckoned that higher food
costs in Ireland helped farmers to the extent of £97 millions. This was not all
extra costs to non-agriculture since EEC membership led to the abolition of farm
income and input price arrangements costing £40 millions to non-farmers so that
the net cost was £57 millions, However since the income rise of non-farmers
was not attribui:able exclusively to the EEC a policy of maintaining farm incomes in
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line with non farm incomes would have cost the non farmer sector more than
£57. Thus it could be argued that the cost to non-farmers was even reduced by
EEC membership. The exact calculation was complicated by changes in Irish
food price policy.
The non agricultural productive sector
The main industrial gainers from agricultural exports are the
food processing industries but here rationalisation has made it difficult to isolate
the employment increases. The Copeland/Henry multipliers provide a breakdown
of the GNt° multiplier into household income, government income, saving and
imports. From this Attwood reckoned that about half the multiplier effect accrued
to non agricultural households. This was of particular importance given that it
accrued when these households were suffering the effects of the world recession
and helps explain why Irish growth rates were still able to reach an impressive
3% in real ~erms in these difficult times.
Unfortunately Attwood did not report the impact on industry of
government income and savings multipliers except to note that higher State receipts
may have helped Social Welfare beneficiaries. He concluded that distribution of
internal benefits in Ireland depends to a considerable extent on Irish income and
fiscal policies which are not determined by the EEC. (British policy on the green
pound no doubt is in part such a distributional policy. )
Attwood did not make separate calculations of the impact on consumers,
arguing that the impact was equivalent to that on the economy as a whole, or on the
non-agricultural sector depending on the definition chosen.
In conclusion he commented that Irish farm prices were determined
by three actions: I. Annual EEC price changes.
2. Harmonisation of Irish prices with EEC in
the transition period.
3. Green pound changes.
Of the three the latter had had the greatest impact on farm prices and has been totally
unforeseen before entry. These latter changes, he reckoned, had added £500 m. to
farm output and £360 m. to balance of payment receipts in 1978 though they also
increased the cost of farm inputs and imports. The total impact of CAP on Ireland
had been good and had been expected before entry. There had been no great future in
our previous exposed position in the regime of distorted international competition.
The benefits of CAP are not therefore seen in Ireland" as some additional reward
over and above what was an otherwise fair and reasonable balance between itself and
its trading partners but as a contribution towards such a reasonable balance - which
did not exist prior to 1972".
This assessment by Attwood of the impact of CAP has not yet been
published nor circulated in Irish economic circles. Accordingly there has been little
opportunity to obtain a critical reaction to the methodology adopted or to examine the
assumptions. It is presented here as an interesting and thorough investigation of one
aspect of EEC membership.
Other Critiques
Other critiques of CAP have been less comprehensive.
In section I it was noted that the new found wealth of farmers has
quickened the pace of rural life and reinforced the incipient tendency towards a
revival of rural communities and improved demographic structures in areas which
until quite recently had a long tradition of decline. (Commins et al (1978) have warned
that concern with farming has led to general lack of appreciation of the plight of other
rural dwellers not engaged in farming who were often much worse off than farmers.
Among farmers these authors have shoval a widening gap between the fortunes of small
mid large farmers. Setting the average income of farmers in each farm size category
in the National Farm Surveys of 1966 to 1969 at 100, the average income after EEC
entry was as follows (averaging the results for 1972 to 1975)
i0
Size
5 - 15 acres
15 - 30 "
30 - 50 "
50 - 100 "
I00 - 200 "
200 + "
Index
183
213
229
220
274
282
Surveys of herd size by the Central Statistics Office have shown a
tendency towards increased concentration which has been particularly marked for
pigs.
Regional impact
A study by Matthews (1978) has generally confirmed the growing
accentuation of dualism in Irish farming following on the dissolution of the western
small farm economy eloquently painted by Hannah and others. This view has been
challenged by Attwood (1978) who himself expressed his surprise at the findings in
the Irish Farm Management Surveys that "in fact it is the smaller and poorer farms
which have seen the largest increases in incomes." This material is given in Appendix
Table 5. My own study of 1977 does not show such a neat pattern. In the poor province
of Connacht the position was as Attwood showed it for 1976. However in the rich
provinces of Munster told Leinster although farms below 20 hectares made substantial
increases, the largest farms were very c0nsiderably more prosperous. Farms over
200 acres (80 hectares) had three times the income increases of smaller farms with
the contrast being even greater in Leinster between these and farms of 50 - 100 acres.
In these circumstances vie may need to revise Attwood’s conclusion that "the economic
outlook for the smaller farmer is now more optimistic than it has been for many
years, though there remain problems primarily of a social character which are in
large measure intrinsic to small farm areas in Ireland".
County Impact of EEC Transfers                 .,
Another measure of EEC impact would be to take the agricultural transfers
and allocate them regionally. Table 6 in the Appendix gives the official statement of
transfers to Ireland. Table 7 in the Appendix provides a county allocation for the
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major product headings within Table 6 without allowances for MCAs. It is at once
apparent that there are major differences between counties with the flows to poor
counties, e.g. in Connacht, very considerably below those to the rich counties of
Munster. The poor counties frequently are associated with the production of sheep,
potatoes or oats, products which do not feature Jn the Common Agricultural Policy.
The table does not include other price rises, e.g. for milk for human consumption
since it is paid by Irish consumers. Irish sheep prices have benefitted from a special
arrangement with France in recent times but is this related to EEC membership ?
Clearly a full evaluation needs to go beyond the impact of direct transfers,
as Attwood has shown.
The Futureof the Guarantee Fund
In 1978 Agricultural transfers amounted to 0.42% of EEC GDP or 2.7%
of C0mmtmity expenditure on food. This is not a large sacrifice if policy is achieving
a unified restructured common market for agricultural products. Nevertheless there
has been opposition, mainly in the UK and Italy but also among other consumer lobbies,
though the CAP was accepted when these coLmtries joined. To meet thesecbjections the
EEC has made a full scale review of CAP for the UK in 1975. Special import arrange-
ments have been made benefitting, either the UK consumer or the UK special relation-
ships with third countries, or both e.g. butter and cheese from New Zealand, beef from
Botswana, sugar from ACP countries. For Italy there were special reduced levies on
feed grains, marketing premia for lemons and processed fruits in addition to the very
large community schemes of aid for irrigation, afforestation and advisory services
adopted by the Comlcil in i 978.
The" accession of new members will increase these pressures for change.
Irish production is more concentrated on cattle and milk as the Table shows. Should
therebe a shift in the basket of goods away from these products, or quotas, the
opportunities for Irish growth would be curtailed. For example the proposal to step
up cereal production as food aid would help ]?rance and Italy but leave little scope for
Irish developments.
FEOGA Guarantee payments in the EEC and Ireland by main products
MCAs
Milk
Cereals
Sugar
Oil and fats
Beef
Fruit and Vegetables
Tobacco
Wine
Pigmeat
Other
EEC
42%.
20.9
11.2
5.8
5.4
3.7
2.9
1.6
1.0
5.3
100.0
IRELAND
55.0%
3.2
2.0
30.7
0.1
6.3
I00.0
Apart from the operation of CAP itself the existence of MCAs has
produced many distortions of trading, some of which have been referred to already.
For example there are no MCAs on cooked meat (because the Commission considers
that the resulting import changes on entry into ’strong currency areas would breach
a GATT regulation) whereas MCAs do apply to carcase beef. Irish carcase beef is
therefore subsidised on entry into Britain. The potential of the Irish meat packaging
industry is curtailed and UK processed meat (of Irish origin) can undercut the Irish
equivalent on all markets.
Another anomaly occurs because some agricultural products are not
subject to CAP. Thus German pig feeders can import manioc mid soyabeans from
the Third World to feed to their livestock and export the produce with an MCA subsidy
for products exported from hard currency areas. Another’ curiosity is that the MCAs
hit Irish exports to the United States by taxing them even though Ireland was the only
EEC country involved in the trade.
The Guidance ~hnl.d
Even. though the EEC has provided a massive injection of income into
Irish farming many areas are characterised by farms which do not correspond to
Mansholt’s old idea of economic production units (epu). It is the object of the guidance
section of FEOGA to improve farming structures so that in the future CAP can be
relatedto such epus. This is the rationale for the Farm Modernisai;ion Scheme.¯
This scheme and the Disadvantaged areas scheme have been severely Criticised by
Cox, Commins and Curry in a number of publications. The farm modernisation
scheme cost £12.34 millions in 1976 of which the EEC paid £1 million. Only 4% of
Irish farmers were classifiable as commercial farmers and 16% as development
farmers. 80% were thus to be written off. Even among development farmers
western cotulties such as Mayo and Clare respectively had 2% and 6% respectively.
The scheme favoured those with land resources rather than managerial ability and
did nothing to help with the major Irish problem of land mobility. The Disadvantaged
Areas scheme was designed for areas of the Alps in danger of depopulation and was
intended to pay farmers there to act as ’landscape managers’. The aids in the Irish
context were too low and conflict with the EEC Objective of encouraging structural
reform through retirement schemes. In 1976 the scheme cost £13.5 millions of
which EEC paid £4.7. Neither scheme was in any relevant to Irish conditions and
failed to recognise that policies of reducing the farm population may not be appropriate
iF off-farmemployment is not available. *
Examination of the takeup of the various directives 159,
160, 161 of 1972 and 268 of 1975 show that Germany drew most oll the
first two, France on the third with the UK and France prominent in the fourth: Other
schemes - the conversion of herds to beef and payments for non marketing of milk
have been largely drawn on by the UK and Germany respectively. In many cases Italy
made no claims at all. Irish farm experts have urged that Ireland do likewise as many
of the arrangements are bad value even if partly financed by the EEC. Ireland needs
schemes, or freedom, to develop strategies appropriate to its situation.
This is not to say that recognition of the difficulties of Irish farm structure
has been lacking in Brussels. Recent announcements include a £42 million drainage
scheme for western areas and as yet undefined package for these areas totally £180
million. In both cases the EEC will pay half. If, as has been hinted, these schemes
* see Table 1 in the Appendix.
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will extend over 10 years the annual investment does not appear so great given the
magnitude of the problem: A more fundamental question to me is whether drainage
and farm infrastructure in the West are the top-most priorities for scarce funds.
A regional breakdown of mostGuidance payments is available and shows
a considerable spread of investments.
~lanufac turing
Access to the EEC has encouraged non EEC firms to invest in Ireland
in anticipation of entry and more especially since entry. Japanese and US firms
have been the major investors. The IDA reckons that US investment between
1973-1978 has a job potential of 37,300. In 1978 13,500 new overseas job approvals
came from firms outside the EEC. The Confederation of Irish Industry estimated
that between 1973-1977 new overseas post 1972 industries contributed a gain of
15,000 in manufacturing employment. New overseas firms of less recent vintage
had some fluctuating employment but suffered no net losses while the remainder
of established industry which still accounted for 77% of the total in 1977 had net
losses of 20,000 with ahnost 80% occurring in 1976. In total a net loss of 5,000
was estimated by the CII for thi s period.
The IDA reckon that Ireland has been a success story within the EEC
between 1975 and 1977 and give the following figures in support of their claim
showing Ireland as the only country that increased manufacturing employment in
the period.
Ireland
UK
France
Italy
Germ any
Netherlmlds
% change 1975-77
Outpu t Job s
+19.7 +4.7
+ 2.9 -1.0
+10.5 -2.0
+12.0 -5.0
+10.5 -3.0
+ 6.7 -7.0
The IDA estimates do not correspond with those of the CII which give job losses
of 12.3 thousand for 1975 to 197.7 inclusive. On the other hand the Labour Force
Surveys of 1975 and 1977 show job gains of 2,900.
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In the regional context EEC entry, the Anglo Irish Free Trade
Agreementand the reduction of tariffs have led to a curious situation in which
net job losses were experienced in the hitherto prosperous regions, especially the
East and North east regions as protection was dismantled while less industrialised
regions benefitted from the new IDA firms. The approximate position is as £ollows
Region
East
North
South West
South East
Midlands
Change 1971/7
-8.8
-I. 4
+0.8
+1.7
+0.0
Change 1966/71
+3.9
+2.7
+1.7
+2.9
+0.9
-7.7 +12.1
Mid West +4.0 +1.1
We st +4.5 +0.9
North We st/Donegal +1.8 1.1
+10.3 +3.1
Total +2.6 +15.2
IDA policy and EEC membership have contributed to this unusual outcome.
The job losses occurred to a considerable extent in the types of
firms which it had been EEC implicit policy to leave to the Third World - clothing,
textiles, footwear, fum~ture etc. These labour intensive industries are easy to
enter for any small or less wealthy economy and had naturally grown up under
protective walls in Ireland. Their decline may not be due to EEC solely since
free trade andthe recession also played a part.
The losses in the footwear industry have been particularly striking:
Footwear
Employment Production Consumption Imports
1969 6160 8996 n.a.
1972 5200 7611 8463 3351
1976 3450 4900 9817 7257
~978) 0650) (5000) ~1800). (9400)
% imports
39
74
(80)
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Employment in the clothing industry fell from 16,800 in
1974 to 11,900 1n1978 whereas textiles fell from 22~00 in 1974 to 19,000
in 1976 but recovered somewhat to 20,100 by 1978. In this case heavy job
losses in the traditional sector were balanced by new jobs in new concerns
such as Burlington, Asahi, Snia etc.
The negotiations in regard to these sensitive industries
illustrate many features of EEC impact on Ireland. Ireland is prohibited from
imposing import controls since these are decided by the EEC. In the case of clothing
the EEC has negotiated the Multifibres Agreement. Imports into the EEC are
allocated ona country basis. The advantages of Ireland’s small import
quotas, however, have been nullified by the principle of ’free circulation’
under which another member state can export part of its quota to Ireland.
Ireland has,however, been able to get Commission approval for derogation
in many cases where this has happened but preferential countries mainly
Mediterr,’mean cannot be barred on this basis.
Irish exports and sales on the home market have been made
difficult by the British Temporary Employment Subsidy of £20 per worker per
week in ’sensitive industries’. Ireland complained and when the UK (which is
the source of 80% of imports in the Irish market)refused to negotiate an
arrangement,the Commission authorised Ireland to hnpose tariffs and to pay
the Employment Maintenance Subsidy of £5 a week whiie the UK persisted.
This has proved effective.
In making its case to the Commission Irelmld was required to
check if dumping was occurring, if rationalisatlon of the industry could not be
an alterllative and if the potential of markets was fully exploited. As a result
the industry was subjected to a consultancy study and CTT (the Export Bo’ard) was
/involved in
market promotion. The result was encouraging for many Irish firms and where
closures occurred the factories were often reopened on a smaller and more
DISTRIIIUTION IN .IRELAND
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MANUFACTURERS OF COMPUTERS. COMPUTER EQUIPMENT OR COMPUTER COMPONENTS
Dundalk - 2
¯ Tuam - 2
¯ Mountbcllen- I
Galway - 3
Kells- 1 ¯
 Ballivor- I
9 TuUamore - !
¯ Listowel- 1
e Tulla - !
DEnnis - 2 o Nenagh - I
1 ¯ Caflow - IShannon - 4 0 Templemore-
OLimerick- I ¯ Thurles--I
¯ Tipperary - !
¯ Clonmel- !
Watefford
¯
Mallow - 2
Droghcda - I
Bray- I
Wexford - !
Ballincollig - I-
Kin.sale I
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efficient basis by someone else. The refusal of the Commission to take the
easy way out has probably improved the long run viability of mmly firms in
the industry.
Another device used especially by Germany has been sanctioned
by the Commission (due to German muscle). This is outward processing by which
products, such as cloth, are retained in German ownership and sent to East
Germany, the Philipines, Brazil etc. where labour intensive processes are
performed and the product brought back to Germany again. Presumably Germany
also benefits from inducements in the other country. This enables Germany to
compete against lower cost firms within the CommUnity. Clearly member states
would not wish to be the outward processors themselves and the issue is about
the competitive edge that this practice affords German firm s.
The Irish firms that have suffered from the freeing of trade have
been scattered widely over the country and have given valuable employment in
many small towns. Statistics are not yet available to pinpoint accurately the
location of these losses. There have b.een gains as well as losses. The CII have shown
y~hat the new computer industry is also widely scattered as the map shows. In 1978 this
"if/dus try .had 45 firms employing 5, 500 and is projected to employ 8,200 in 63 firms bythe
end of next year. If these extra jobs are real they compensate in numbers for the :-
losses in the footwear industry between 1969 and 1976 and presumably have a brighter
future. (Lamberton has shown that in~developed economies over 50% of employment
is in information activities so that a lead in mtcroprocessing is to be preferred to
maintenance of traditional manufacturing provided, of course, that Ireland realises
the opportunities this affords).
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Ireland’s success in attracting computers and synthetic
fibre industries have been two major coups for the IDA because the interests
of developing a European computer arrangement and over capacity in synthetic
fibres could have prevented us getting these industries at a later date. This
raises the question of other ways that EEC membership can affect Ireland.
The Treaty of Rome rules out State aids. The Commission must
ensure that distortion of competition does not occur but it may grant derogations
and does for certain Social and RegionalAids. Ireland’s needs of structural
change are reeognised in protocol 30 of the Treaty of Accession However:
L The export sales relief arrangement has been crtttcised by Britain and the
EEC and is now replaced by a 10% profits tax. It is not clear if this will
affect the attractiveness of Ireland for foreign investors. By slurring the
emphasis off the export market it may yield a net benefit if the home market
is more actively serviced. How to measure this is not clear.
2. The competition for footloose foreign firms has led to wasteful outbidding
between member states as the Ford’s Bridgend decision clearly illustrates.
This competition is even from central areas. It is in everyone’s interest (except
the foreign firms) that this outbidding be controlled and the EEC has decided
in January that ceilings of 20%,30% and 75% be imposed on regional aids in central,
intermediate and peripheral areas respectively. Ireland is a peripheral area.
This arrangement is less of a bomls that would appear a_ priori
As the Bridgend case showed regional aids can be combined with sectoral
aids (and finance from the Coal and Steel Community which is largely
an advantage unavailable in Ireland’)
There is no limit on the scale of the aid.
£106,000 per job for locating in Scotland.
Hoffman La Roche was offered
Even if this was only 30%
of investment smaller poorer are~ cannot compete. Incidentally the
alternative site for this pharmaceutical firm was Switzerland which
2O
offers few inducements and so a measure of the cost of remoteness can be
gained in this instance.
(c) Putting limits on EEC aids means that the firm can receive larger aids
elsewhere e.g. Malta and be ensured of virtually free access of its products
to the EEC under the preferential country arrangements. The liberal trade
policy of the EEC means that state aids have replaced tariffs in protecting
home industries. Richer countries can afford more apart from their other
advantages.
(d) The regulations do not relate to soft loans by the State e.g. The State may
lend to a commercial bank at a nominal interest rate on the understanding
that the loan will be passed on to the firm. Similarly State equity is not
covered.
This catalogue of snags should be treated with caution. Many officials
with whom I spoke in Industry and Commerce, the IDA and Corns Tractala reported
that their experience of the Commission was that the officials make a genuine
effort to help Ireland and that there was considerable sympathy for our efforts.
Apart from these aspects of industrialpolicy EEC regulations affect
industry in many other ways. Currently a member of the CII staff is making a study
of the 480 Directives that he has identified as affecting industry. As the regulations
change so rapidly this level of bureaucracy imposes a particular burden on the
small firms that will be most representative of peripheral areas.
The Commission does not only intervene to regulate state aid. It
has also attempted to ban or regulate aids to certain sectors where there is reckoned
to be over capacity in the EEC in general. As mentioned already Ireland was lucky
to get synthetic fibre industries when it did. The expansion programme for Irish
Steel Holdings proved quite tricky.
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The problem with these bans is that they donot ban restructuring.
Thus a country can use this euphemism for what is in fact new investment provided
always it has firms to restructure and this will often be not the case in Ireland.
Again a ban on new investment ir~,say, footwear could be a thinly
disguised form of protection for existing firms. The EEC belief in competition
would appear to be at variance with such practices.
It is necessary therefore in considering regional or social fund
projects to refer to sectoral policies also since certain legitimate projects under "
the former schemes can fall foul of sectoral goals and EEC support therefore
withheld.
Trade:
As mentioned earlier EEC trade in industrial goods has been
liberalised so that the advantages of membership are not as great as they would
be in a more protectionist community.
enjoy considerable freedom of entry.
protection has been created.
have already spoken.
Many preferential and ACP countries
In these circumstance new forms of
One of these relates to state aids of which we
The second concerns non tariff barriers to trade. Alan McCarthy
of CTT has distinguished sixteen general classes of barriers. What Carter called
"orderly marketing arrangements" Barre in Frmlee called ,’organised free trade
programmes" and the British Dell described as "voluntary controls" Old-
fashioned economists called them quotas. GATT has compiled seven volumes
documenting dodges of one sort or another while within the EEC the number
of complaints has risen from 20 a few years ago to 400 last year. The Centrally
plam~ed economies have a perfect system whereby all imports are bought by the
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State and there is no point of salesmen trying to penetrate the market. In some
EEC countries national monopolies for alcohol or cigarettes can imitate this practice
to some extent. In all countries government purchase accomlts for a sizeable
Share of the market and public authorities have ways of discriminating in favour of the
home product which the Commission has not been able to control. Equally while
’Buy Irish’ or ’Buy Dutch’ campaigns are outlawed alternative devices such as
"approved by the Design Centre in London" "guaranteed Irish" may have a sales
promotion element where local chauvinism has not reached French levels. ’Which’
type reports can als0 exercise a similar influence where the local consumers are
nationalist in outlook. Other tricks relate to packaging regulation, as in the UK,
import bureaucracy in both France and Italy, French language leaflets,health and
environmental regulations,testing requirements changed rapidly to hit imports
particularly and fiscal devices designed to affect only imports e.g. the strength
of beer in Frmlce.
It is clear that the EEC attempts to apply standards is an effort
to overcome this which has as yet limited success but presumably if successis
achieved this will be in the long run interest of countries like Ireland that depend
for their prosperity on a level of external trade greater than that of most member
states.
An enumeration of difficulties is an indication of the growing
pains involved. Irish trade was traditionally concentrated on the UK market.
The exports of new industries has been credited by McAleese as a major factor in the
diversification of exports - another consequence of EEC membership. The shift
in exports is continuously monitored by Coras Tractala and the extent of the shift
has been dramatised by a comparison of exports shares in 1967 and 1977. In both
years 76.2% went to the EEC but the distribution was different.
UK
Other EEC
All EEC
EFTA
North America
Other markets
1977     1967
47. O 66.8
29.2 9.4
76.2 76.2
3.1 1.3
7.3 14.7
13.4 7.8
iOO. O lOO.O
In spite of this shift Cond0n of CTT reckoned that over 70% in the
traditional sectors of textiles, clothing, wood and furniture (employing 43,000
peoPle) went to the UK. These firms were often [llequipped with marketing
expertise and could run into difficulties [f the EMS led to a shift in the value
of sterling.
One aspect of these changes that bothers me is the nature of Irish
exports. 90% of agricultural exports are governed by CAP and therefore the
market outlets are less dependent on price and aggressive salesmanship. Much
of the new exports are part of an international trading arrangements and therefore
import and export prices in Ireland are notional. In these circumstances the
devaluation experience arising from the link with sterling has not been a major
help to Irish exports in many sectors.
In fact devaluation through the operation of the MCA scheme has been
harmful in several instances. This argm~aent falls down if a substantial part
of Ireland’s high level of exports has been due to devaluation rather than export
sale relief on new industries but MeAleese’s figures would not support this (?)
On the other hand consumer goods aJ~d many agricultural inputs which are
imported have been dearer for Irish buyers and help to reinforce the demoralising
effects of imported inflation. Thus we lose on imports and do not gain on exports.
If this argument has any merit membership of EEC and successful participation
in the EMS could be of considerable benefit to the Country in many respects.
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The regional fund
As noted already Ireland’s hopes of a large regional fund were
disappointed. The fund is small and relates to half the community area and
one third its population so that its impact anywhere is marginal. The enlarge-
ment of the Community will place even greater demands on it so that its
underlying philosophy will need revising. It seems to have been based On the
idea that every country should have a regional problem area and that firms
should be encouraged to go there to relieve congestion in the major industrial
areas. Ireland does not have major industrial areas. The recession and the
resultant unemployment everywhere seems to have weakened the will of the
Community members to pursue effective regional policies.
In Ireland the EEC contribution to regional development applies
to the whole area and amounts to 2% of the Public Capital Programme. The
projects assisted will receive 34% of their funding from the Community. Up
to end 1977 267 projects were approved and a further 121 projects in 1978.
Since this is an average of £152,000 per project the Irish government can
submit claims (for projects costing less than £4.2 millions) on a grouped basis.
Details of individual projects are not available. Given the small amount of
the EEC contribution relative to the Public Capital Programme, there is no
difficulty in submitting projects from a widely dispersed background,as the
accompanying map indicates.
This map only shows the location of factories, other maps show
the location of telephone exchanges, water and sewerage schemes etc. In a
programme of industrial development these latter schemes are becoming
increasingly more important.
The Social l%md
The social fund has been designed to help depressed industrial
regions with their retraining needs. It is not concel"ned with poverty or
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redistribution. Even in training the handicapped in Ireland can only be
supported provided they are guaranteed a lob at the end- a stipulation that
does not apply to the able-bodied. Widening the scheme to help the handi-
capped more would enable the Dutch and Germans to seek reeoupments of their
large expenditures in this area and leave less in the Fund for countries that
cannot rise to equally large outlays.
A major growth in the social fund has been the rise of AnCO .-
the Industrial Training Authority. This authority is only partly financed by
Brussels and discharges many of the functions of vocational training. However
AnCO trainees are patd allowances whereas technical students are not. Pre-
sumably the introduction of AnCO was necessary because the existing structures
were not flexible enough. The existence of EEC money has led the Irish govern-
ment todivert funds away from secondary education so that many ’free’ schools
have been compelled to reintroduce contributions to survive. The reorientation
may have been justified in the light of the nation’s need but was this the best
way to do it?
Part of the social fund arrangement has been the introduction of
equal pay and equal opportunity. This reform, while a ’good thing’, will alter
the chances of employment of many people and the viability of firms and have
differential regional impacts, mainly in ’sensitive’ industries already experien-
cing difficulties.
A minor element in the social fund has been the financing of
combat poverty schemes. A larger network of well designed pilot schemes
under this programme should form the basis,for a new approach to regional
mobilisation.
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It is possible to develop a regional allocation of social fund
expenditures. Payments to firms are available while AnCO publishes its
outlay by centre.
Transport etc.
The payments of the UK government to Hoffman La Roche
to locate in Scotland showed the cost of inducing that firm to locate in a
peripheral area.* As the regulation of state aids to industry begins to bite
it is essential to find other ways of overcoming the costs of remoteness.
Transport policy regulation in the EEC has not applied to routes involving
sea crossings. There is need for a Burke plan that improves access both
to Ireland itself and to the regions within Ireland. At present Burke is reported
to be considering increasing competition within the airlines. Cheaper access
would help both industry and tourism, often proposed as a solution to peripheral
area problems. If competition policy could be extended to road and sea
transport, telecommunications, road building, sewerage andwater provision,
these could have a greater value for the remoter regions than schemes presently
offered. Without such plans the freedom that the EEC values can only be a
freedom for the rich central areas to augment their prosperity.
The EEC does not have any plans for income redistribution directly.
This is in keeping with its interest in market solutions. However that does
not preclude it from having policies which aim at providing greater self-help
and enterprise in local conimunities. The problem of disparities is not purely
an economic one. Institutional factors also play a role in determining a region’s
response to economic shocks and opportunities.
The cost per job was 70% of the level of EEC support in Irelandper total
project under the regional fund.
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A Final note
This paper has viewed the EEC from an Irish viewpoint. The
criticisms made hopefully do not detract from the main thesis that Ireland has
been transformed in many ways by the events of the lastsix years. These
demographic and economic changes are putting a tremendous challenge before
the Irish people of redeeming the losses of their past.
for effort by the Irish themselves but as enthusiastic
Much of this will call
Europeans we look to
Europe to help us with this vision. Experience to date has shown that there is a
large fund of goodwill for our efforts. Coupled with understanding of our tasks
and a clear articulation of comprehensive region policy the task will be all the easier.
Peferences
Attwood; E.A. (1978) Growth in Irish Agriculture: Fact or Fiction.
The Irish Banking Peview, Sept.
Attwood, E.A. (1979) The consequences of participation in the Common Agricultural
Policy to the Irish Economy. Seminar paper London, March
Blancus, Paolo (1978) The Common Agricultural Policy and the Balance of
Payments of the EEC Member Countries. Baneo Nazionale del Lavoro
Quarterly Peview, December
Chinitz,: B. (1971) National Policy for Pegional Development, in J.F. Kain
and J.P. Meyer (eds) Essays in Pegional Economics Boston: Harvard
Univers ity Press.
Commins, P. P.G. Cox, J. Curry (1978) Pural Areas: Change and Development
NESC Peport No. 41. Dublin
Copeland, J.P. and E.W. Henry (1975) Irish Input-Output Income Multipliers
1964 and 1968. ESPI Report No. 82. Dublin
Hannan, D. and J.P. O’Carroll (1976) The sociology of regionalisation Pegional
Studies Workshop University College, Cork.
Hechter, M. (1975) Internal Colonialism:. The..Celtic Fr!n~e in British National
Development, /1536-1966 London: Pout[edge and Kegan Paul.
Kennedy, Kieran A. (1978) Industrial Development in the Pepublic of Ireland
Second International Conference on Industrial Economics. Szekesfehervar
Hungary.
Maclennan, Pobert, (1978) Food Prices and the Common Agricultural Policy,
The Three Banks Peview, Sept.
Matthews, A. (1978) The State of Irish Agriculture Magill, lVlay,
Myrdal, G. (1957) Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Pe~’ions,
Duckworth and Co.
Dub l in
London:
Poss, Miceal, Poderick Jones and Eoin O’Malley (1977) Personal Incomes
by County in 1973. NESC No, 30. Dublin.
Poss, Miceal (1978), Comprehensiveness in Pegional Policy in B. P. r_iowling
and J. Durkan (eds) Irish Economic Policy: . A Peview of Major Issues
ESPI Dublin
Poss, Miceal (1979) The regional dimension of the Full Employment Target
Conference of regional bodies, Limerick.
Schumacher, E.F. (1973) "Towards a theory of large scale organisation",’ in
Small is Beautiful London: Blond and Briggs.
Vining D.P. Jr. and T. Kontuly (1978) Population Dispersal from ~vIajor
Metropolitan Pegions: An international comparison" International
Pegional Science .Peview. Vol. 3 No. 1.
Weintraub, Dov (1970) l~ural Periphery, Societal Center and their Interaction
in the process of agrarian development: A comparative framework.
Pural Sociology, Vol. 35. No. 3.
,t .
rc/(~&-Tt tT7t-77
-’;’~ I 260
~oo
I
~-1"~ I ~7~" 16oo
,t-’n I ~5~o - t~l.¢"
6-7t 1 I%o40 6~’t)
I
/¢g ~,. ~ ;.2 o o
?.-9o - ZS’o --%7o &’[o    --Ilgo     tZO    -I~?.0
-- 60 - ~o    - 900     -I~oo    -~&~
3*0 67~" 6Z~" "1~’o 700
~’o I’JZO tCoo 2 1"2 ~’ 16 ~’t,
"/7 - ~’t I
"~1-171
~ -~!
~7-~
’ ?I-’~9
[/6;7~,
~0~o 7~’o I~*~ ~’80 ..~4 o 2Zo . I~o
l’;9f~ I~,oo
~.7$o t.TzC to¢;o
6,94-’7 $2Z’~ ~ ~t 1;.7 - 17
9Z~ 9 ~5
~0o
2.1.o
~z9    q$~    IZ7Y    117~
gLo Z6o ~o      Z6o
on. F.cl~,,d t~aFes.
Appendix
Tabl-. 2: Budget of the EEC in 1978 and 1979 (mllllon EUA)
1978 1979     % 1979 "
Agricultural levies 1686. 1 1706. 0 12.1 Commission Interventions 10892.3 12486. S 88.8
Sugar levy 376.9 467.0 3.3 of which: agriculture 9132.9 10263.1 73.0
Custom duties 4833.0 4745.5 33.8 Social A flairs 559. I 748. 2 5. 3
GNP based financial contribution 5330. 8 6982.5 49. 7 Regional A flairs 525.0 390.0 2.8
0. 7790 of VAT - - Research (Energy industry transport) 295.3 520.3 3.7
Miscellaneous 135.9 158.5 . 1.1 Development Cooperation 380.9 564.9 4.0
1978 1979 ~ 1978
Admlnis’rat[o,l 550.9 599.1 4.3
Reserves 5. 0 30. 0 O. 2
Repayment of duties 689.6 691.8 4. 9
~.
Other Institutions 224.9 252.1 I. 8
Total 12362.7 14059. fi 100. 0 Total 12362.7 14059. 5 100. 0
9oureeI Bulletin of the EumFcan Communities Supplement 6/78 Preliminary draft general budget of the EurOpean Communities for the Financial Year
1979 General Introduction,
--Table 3: Ireland’s receipts from, and payments to,, the European’Community 1973 to November 1978
.(1 million)
1973 1974    1975 1976 1977    1978 (excluding
December)
Receipts
FEOGA - Guarantee 36. 6 63.8 102.2 102. 0 245.1
of which MCA’s to UK and Itaiy(a)
-24. 0 -128. 0
FEOGA Guidance                      - - 0. 4 3.0 7.3
European Social Fund - 3. 6 4. 0 4.6 8. 2
European Regional Development
Fund "- 1. 8 8. 5 8. 5
Studies etc. (b) - 0. 2 0. 3 0.4 1. 0
Social security for migrants 1.5 I. 3 2.0 2. 2 3.3
317. 1
- 122. 4
3. 6
18.8
8.3
0.8
3.3 (est)
Total 38. 1    68. 9    110. 7 96. 7 145.4 229. 5
Payments
To Commission                      5. 3 6. 7 9. 8 13.4 22.1
To EIB 0.8 0. 8 0.4 0. 2 O. 2
To ECSC/EURATOM etc. - 0.3 0. 5 1.3 I. 6
38.1
0.6
1.2
Total 6. 1 7.8 I0.7    14.9 23.9 39. 9
Loans
EIB ll. 1 24.8 22.0 35. 4 52. 1 78. 5
ECSC 0. 2 - I. 2 - -
Community loan - - 156. 0 -
Total 11.3    24. 8 23.2 191.4    52.1 78. 5
(a) paid to Ireland since 17May 1976
(b) Includes regional studies, projects to combat poverty, research and investment projects hydro-
carbon projects and other studies.
"
Table ~ Effects of E~. Membership on the
Incrqmental Value of Exports of Irish Agricultural
Products to Other Member States.
oduct
/
carrie (CO0 live
ec aivalent)
 u ter (000
Oheo o
S~im Milk ~zder
OCO ton3
Other-(pigmeat, eerealsp
other izilk ro’/ucts/mt)
q
Total
Volume .EzportXefvnd
t£ per unit)
1978 19781976
],051
58
53
IO3
L
1977
.,335
40
38
73
1,551
72
42
47
1976 1977
70 77~8
7i0 IOC7.8
380 282.9
340 439.1
139.3
1241.2
360.9
502.3
Estimated total increu~ntk...~]
1976 1977
73.6 105.9
41.2 40.3
20.1 10.7
35.0 32.1
-19.9 -18.4
i11  .6
1978
216.1
89.4
15.2
23.6
-14,0
348.3
TABLE ~"
Changes |n Gross Output and Income 1972/76 by Size and Location of Farm.
Farni. Size Gross O,itput 1976 {1972 ~ 1001 Family Farm h,eome 1976 (1972 = I00)
(acres) Ireland Munster Cornacht Ireland Munster Connacht
5-15 239 171 327 285 171
15-30 236 219 242 236 200
30-50. 249 250 240 240. 226
50--I 00 215 213 205 19,3 181
100-..200 215 221 183 191 185
200+ 225 233 234 171 189
All Farms 225 226 230 206 191
410
254
249
208
165
160
237
Source: An Foras Taluutais. Farm Management Survey 1972-7.5 and ¯1976.
Table 6:
"-3U-
Appendix
Official Irish statement of FEOGA transfers 4£000)
FEOGA GUARANTEE
Dairying
Beef
Pigs
Poultry
.-Cereals
Fruit & Vegetables
Processed Products
Sugar
Seeds
Fish.
Other
Intervention Expenses
¯Total
MCAs export
of which UK & Italy
Mi Ik levy
No of projects
Dairying
Meat processing
Cereals
Water supplies
Fish
Misce’llaneous
Total
1973
31,213
214
346
17
1,158
112
2,504
522
85
36,172.
25
1,888
604
116
136
129
1974
29,408
15,348
3,280
5
321
64-2
2,097
942
95
m
25
11,616
1975
21,731
43,710
-543
.16
.3,946
326
2,512
3, 994
9O
67
26,362
1976
41,033
26,034
480
39
7,508
435
5,436
.2,742
5O
135
.107
18,076
63,778 102,211
1977
122,505
68,366
6,019
132
7,194
315
13,587
4,445
L
52
159
100
22,184
FEOGA Guidance
17 37
565 1,084
659 1,592
33 209
- 289
345. 1,314
- 48
102,076
39,464
24,400
113
1,173
2,905
¯ 896
2,845
1,391
66
2,873 1,850 4~, 536 9,458
245,061
50,030
126,974
723
101
1,503
1,934
1,116
1,683
850
¯ 426
,
7,513
°z, o79,1
85,1
2 ’s,
F~R~ ’,/J ~,,,(" R,
~___~z~s~. i_,
__ _~.~
._~_4 ~_
,_ o:4 e,4-,l.
._  .Z-z.o
I,, ZSg. 15
I ~ ~4.’Z
IlLI ~, 38 61’~
! 9 0"73.5"
2-.0,5"72.0    I, ~70. Z.
"7 .."/B8. q- z, Io5,~
I g/’777,.4, , , ,-~ ?_S, o
369.~
:~ 52.4
~4o.3
f 9"-/;8,
.~ 9"7.’2_.
l~t 14. Z.
l, IGI.9
"7 g 4-.’-/
~, o 5"z,4
,o
894.0
6 Io.o
I, 394.6
I, IGO.~
6 0"$,~
Gzg]9
6:-17.4
91B.~
6"f ~.’3
I,6 4- 9o’)
5"’91.0
,.d~ 3:3,
"i’6E.9
I, ~6o. ~’"
